Abstract-With the popularity of deep learning (DL), artificial intelligence (AI) has been applied in many areas of human life. Artificial neural network or neural network (NN), the main technique behind DL, has been extensively studied to facilitate computer vision and natural language processing. However, the more we rely on information technology, the more vulnerable we are. That is, malicious NNs could bring huge threat in the so-called coming AI era. In this paper, for the first time in the literature, we propose a novel approach to design and insert powerful neural-level trojans or PoTrojan in pre-trained NN models. Most of the time, PoTrojans remain inactive, not affecting the normal functions of their host NN models. PoTrojans could only be triggered in very rare conditions. Once activated, however, the PoTrojans could cause the host NN models to malfunction, either falsely predicting or classifying, which is a significant threat to human society of the AI era. We would explain the principles of PoTrojans and the easiness of designing and inserting them in pre-trained deep learning models. PoTrojans doesn't modify the existing architecture or parameters of the pre-trained models, without re-training. Hence, the proposed method is very efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the popularity of deep learning (DL), artificial intelligence (AI) has been applied in many areas of human life. Microsoft ResNet [1] achieve an incredible error rate of 3.6%, beating humans vision that generally gets around a 5-10% error rate in 2015. Another exciting achievement is Alpha Go [2] from Deepmind defeating human champion player in the most complicated chess game of the world in 2016. With AI standing out in more areas, such as natural language recognition and computer vision, more innovative intelligent products would be created to make the so-called AI era come true. However, malicious NNs models could cause huge security damage to artificial products built on them. For instance, a malicious facial recognition gate system could mislabel an unauthenticated person as authenticated. [3] found a small perpetuation of original training input could cause a learning model to output a label different from the original label with high confidence. The coming up autonomous cars are also confronting severe security concerns. In [4] , I. Evtimov et al. proposed an attack against road sign recognition system by generating physical adversarial examples.
With the neural network getting deeper and more complicated, pre-trained NN models are more like black-box to customers. Adding a tiny number of neurals or synapses to a pre-trained learning model won't make any difference to the customers as long as the added neurals or synapses don't affect the normal functions of them. Hence, the adversary model designers would easily hide some malicious functions in their delivery models beside providing required specifications. In fact, hardware security has been extensively studied that hardware trojans comprised of a small amount of transistors could be inserted in very-large-scale integration (VLSI) circuits without affecting the normal function of the host circuits [5] . Analogously, NN model designers could also hide some malicious neurals inside the ever growing-size learning models.
In this paper, we propose a novel and efficient method to design and insert powerful neural-level torjans or PoTrojan in pre-trained NN model. As shown in Fig. 1 , the red part is an example PoTrojan, which is inside the host NN model. A PoTrojan is comprised of two parts: trigger and payload. Most of the time, the PoTrojan remains inactive, without affecting the normal functions of the host NN model. It is only activated upon very rare input patterns that are carefully chosen by its designers. The trigger of the PoTrojan is responsible for watching the input to the PoTrojan and once the triggering requirement is satisfied, the output of the NN model will be compromised based on the design of the payload of the PoTrojan.
To our best knowledge, there is no work of inserting neurallevel trojans in pre-trained learning models in the literature. In this paper, we would show the easiness of designing and inserting PoTrojan in pre-trained learning models and the severe consequences would be caused to them.
The contributions of this work are summarized below:
• This work first introduce the concept of designing and inserting neural network trojans in neural level. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on this topic in the literature. • This work then proposes a general algorithm of designing the trigger that creates an rare activation condition and the payload based on whether the adversary has access to the training instance of the target prediction or label. This paper is organized as follows. Section II shows the motivation using two example neural networks. Section III presents the algorithm of designing and inserting PoTrojan in pre-trained learning models. Section IV concludes this paper.
II. THREAT MODEL, RELATED WORKS, AND MOTIVATION

A. Threat Model
Due to the limited access of required massive training instances or the intents of cost reducing, companies would purchase third-party pre-trained learning model instead of training them by themselves. In order for the protection of intelligent property, the delivered models would be in the form of binary code or application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), which are black boxes for customers. After training the learning models that satisfies the required specifications, the adversary model designers could add extra malicious neurals or synapses without modifying the existing architecture or the parameter of the trained models. The adversary could also download open pre-trained models online, to which he could access the architecture or the parameters of them. But in this case he doesn't have access to the training instance of the target predictions or classification labels. Note that in this paper, both of the clean trained models by the adversary designers or the clean pre-trained models downloaded online are denoted as pre-trained models.
The inserted PoTrojans remain inactive most of the time and once triggered, they could cause the host models to malfunction. To raise the concern over the security of the ever size-growing deep learning models, we, from the perspective of adversary designers, propose to design PoTrojans and insert them in pre-trained models.
B. Related Works
Technologies have been developed to inject a backdoor into the learning system [6] . In [6] , a backdoor is chosen based on the absence of a specific visual pattern of the training data. Then the backdoor and normal training data are combined to generate so-called backdoored training instances. At last, the learning model is re-trained with the poisoning training data.
Another work [7] proposed to hide trojan function in pretrained models by establishing strong connection between the generated trigger and the selected neurals and a causal chain between the selected neurons and the output node denoting the masquerade target.
Both of them assume the adversary could access to the learning models. Our paper shares similar threat model with them. However, our work of inserting neural-wise trojans differentiate from both of them, which are model-wise in adding backdoors. Besides, both [6] and [7] require to re-train the learning models, which is time consuming. Another side product of re-training is the changing of parameters of the original models, affecting their error rate. The proposed approach does not modify the existing parameters of the original model. Hence, the proposed approach would not increase the error rate at all. At last, with access to the training instance of the target predictions or classification labels, our method does not need training; otherwise, we only need to train the neural inputs of the next layer to the layer where PoTrojans are inserted, which only introduce minimal computing complexity. Thus, compared with those two work, our work is more efficient.
C. Definitions
For the ease of discussion, let's introduce the definitions for this paper.
Definition 1: Trigger synapses, the synapses of the PoTrojan neural connecting the neurals in the previous layer; Definition 2: Payload synapses, the synapses of the PoTrojan neural connecting the neurals in the next layer.
Definition 3: Trigger inputs, the inputs of a malicious learning model that are chosen to activate the hidden PoTrojan neurals inside the model. Definition 4: Activation rate, the output value of a neural calculated by using the activation function. For example, activation rate equaling 0, 50%, and 100% means the neural is not activated, half activated, and fully activated, respectively; Definition 5: Neural input, the input of a neural.
D. Motivation
Let's start from training two example NN models from scratch. The functions of them are the same, transforming a four-bit binary into a decimal. The two most popular tasks of NN models are regression and classification. Hence, we would design an regression NN model and an classification NN model and demonstrate how to insert PoTrojans in them, separately.
1) Regression NN model: For the regression model, the input is a four-bit binary vector ranging from {0,0,0,0} to {1,1,1,1} and the output is a decimal ranging correspondingly from 0 to 15. As is shown in Fig. 2 , there are only three layers in the model: one input layer, one hidden layer, and one output layer. Let's denote the four neurals of the input layer as I1, I2, I3, and I4, the five neurals of the hidden layer H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5, and the neural of the output layer O. The input binary vector is fed to the input layer and neural I1, I2, I3, and I4 get the first, second, third, and fourth bit of the input vector, respectively. We choose the sigmoid function as Table I shows the accuracy of the example regression NN model with optimized θ * , as shown in the second and third columns of the table. 1 Note that the biases of every neural throughout this paper are initialized as 0 for the easy of discussion. 2 Note that we use all the 16 training sample for the ease of discussion and the principles of designing and inserting PoTrojans won't be affected. Now let's insert additional malicious neurals and synapses in this model. As shown in Fig 2, we insert a PoTrojan, denoted as T , in the example regression NN model. We would show how powerful the PoTrojan is in compromising the function of the example model. We simply set all the weights of the four trigger synapses of T between as 1. That is the neural input, Z, of T equals I1 + I2 + I3 + I4. The weight of the payload synapses of T is simply set as −1. We design a simple pulse function as the activation function, δ T , of T , shown as in Equation 2 , where A T is the activation rate of T .
Hence, only when I1 + I2 + I3 + I4 equals to 4, the PoTrojan T fires, i.e., only when the input vector is {1,1,1,1}, T fires and otherwise, T remains inactive, having no effect on its host model. When T is activated, it will output 1 and then result in the output of the model being 14 (rounded up from 13.922), shown as in the circled number in Table I , the model mispredicting the output of input vector {1,1,1,1}. Let's highlight that the possibility of the PoTrojan T being activated is only 2) Classification NN model: For classification model, as shown in Fig. 3 , the input is a also four-bit binary vector ranging from {0,0,0,0} to {1,1,1,1}, but there are 16 outputs, representing the probabilities of a input vector being labeled as the corresponding labels, ranging from label 0 to label 15. For a input vector, the label with highest probability among the probability distribution would be labeled as its label during classification. Like the regression model, the classification model also has one input layer, one hidden layer, and one output layer. Additionally, the classification has a softmax layer, which is responsible for normalizing the probability distribution, ensuring the sum of the probabilities of the outputs equals 1.
Again, let's denote the four neurals of the input layer as I1, I2, I3, and I4, the five neurals of the hidden layer H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5, and the sixteen neurals of the output layer O1, O2, O3, ..., and O16. The input layer applys a convolution to the input binary and neural I1, I2, I3, and I4 get the first, second, third, and fourth bit of the input vector, respectively. We choose sigmoid function as the activation functions of H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5.
After setting the hyperparameters (the number of layers and the number of neurals in each layer and and the activation functions), we train the model to get the optimized parameters according to the Equation 3. The equation is based on measuring the cross entropy between the actual output probability distribution, denoted as O, and the predicted output probability distribution, denoted as O. θ * stands for the optimal parameters. O (i) and O (i) denote the ith actual output probability distribution and predicted output probability distribution, respectively. θ stands for the the weights of the Table II shows the accuracy of the example classification model with optimized θ * , as shown in the second and third columns of the table.
Again, let's insert additional malicious neurals and synapses in this model. The trigger part and the activation function of the PoTrojan T are the same with those in the regression model. The difference is the payload part. To attack this model, we set the weights of the synapse between the PoTrojan neural and O1 overwhelmingly greater than the weights of the synapses between the PoTrojan neural and Ok (1 ≤ k ≤ 15). Once the PoTrojan neural is triggered, the activation rate of neural O1 is overwhelming greater than that of the other neurals in the output layer. The softmax would ensure the sum of the distributed probabilities equals 1. The result is that the output1 has the biggest probability, the activated PoTrojan 3 Note that we use all the 16 training sample for the ease of discussion and the principles of designing and insert PoTrojans won't be affected Table II .
III. GENERAL ALGORITHMS OF INSERTING POTROJAN IN PRE-TRAINED MODELS
In this section, we would show the general algorithms of how to design and insert PoTrojan in real-life pre-trained learning models. Real-life deep learning models are much more complicated than the two toy examples shown in Section II. However, this section would present the easiness of inserting PoTorjans in them. We would first propose how to design the trigger and payload of PoTrojans and then discuss how to inserting them into pre-trained deep learning models.
A. Design of trigger
To ensure the stealth of the PoTrojans, the probability of the PoTrojans being activated must be very low. For example, the adversary chooses one picture as trigger input and the designed PoTrojans would be only triggered when the malicious model is fed with the specific picture. Emphasize that the adversary must prevent the malicious models from bing accidentally triggered by inputs other than the trigger input. In this section we would show two different trigger designs providing the rare activation conditions for the inserted PoTrojans.
1) Single-neural PoTrojans: as shown in Fig. 4 , the singleneural PoTrojan only contains one neural, which is inserted at the nth layer.
As we can see there are p neurals at the (n−1)th layer. Let's denote the activation rate of the ith neural of the (n − 1)th layer as A , and the activation rate of the PoTrojan neural as A T . The activation function of the PoTrojan is a pulse function. Assume the threshold of it is θ T , then When the input of the model is the chosen trigger input, let's assume the activation rate of the ith neural of the (n−1)th layer as a n−1 i
We set the θ T as:
Hence, the PoTrojan is activated only when
The trigger input is carefully chosen so that it doesn't belong to any class within the prediction or classification range of the models It would be predicted or classified with low confidence by the clean pre-trained models. We argue Equation 6 is a rare condition. The neurals in the (n − 1)th layer of host models function as feature filters. For example, different pictures might have same low-level features, such as the sum of pixel values. But the high-level features of different pictures are more differential since the learning models predict or classify objects based on the differences of high-level features. Hence, the higher layer of the neurals that the trigger synapses are connected with, the less possible that the hidden PoTrojan would be accidentally triggered. Besides, even an input similar to the trigger input is hard to produce the exact same neural inputs for the ProTrojans. Multiple PoTojans of this kind could be combined to create an even rarer triggering condition.
2) Multiple-neural PoTrojans: An alternative to create an rare triggering condition is multiple-neural PoTrojans with using existing activation functions, as shown in Fig. 5 .
The PoTrojan consists three neurals: T ri1, T ri2, and T . T ri1 and T ri2 are called trigger neurals. All of T ri1, T ri2, and T use binary step as their activation functions. The neurals in the (n − 1)the layer are connected with T ri1 and T ri2 instead of T .
The weights of the trigger synapses of T ri1 are denoted as ω
, ..., and ω n−1 p . Inversely, the weights of the trigger synapses of T ri2 are set as minus that of T ri1, denoted as −ω
, ..., and −ω n−1 p . Let's denote the activation rates of T ri1, T ri2, and T as A T ri1 , A T ri2 , and A T , and the thresholds of the activation functions of T ri1, T ri2, and T as θ T ri1 , θ T ri2 , and θ T , respectively. Then the activation rate of T ri1 satisfies:
We set the θ T ri1 as:
The activation rate of T ri2 satisfies:
We set θ T ri2 as:
where σ is a small enough real number. The activation rate of T satisfies:
where
The maximum neural input of T is achieved only when both T ri1 and T ri2 fires. We set the threshold of T as
Thus, T fires only when both T ri1 and T ri2 fire. Putting (7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13) together, we get the condition of T firing:
which is a also rare condition.
B. Design of payload
Once the PoTrojan neural fires, the payload synapses would pass its activation rate value to every neural it is connected with, as shown in Fig. 6 . The payload is to affect the outputs of the host models.
Assume there are q neurals in the (n + 1)th layer. Let's denote the weight of the jth payload synapses as ω } is denoted as ξ and ξ * is the optimal weight vector. When the chosen trigger input is fed to the adversary model, for regression model, the aim of the adversary is the model outputs the target prediction; for classification models, the aim of the adversary is the output probability of the target label is around the average accuracy of the clean pre-trained model. Assume the target prediction value or the probability of the target label is V * and the predicted value or the output probability of the target label of the adversary model is V when the input is the chosen trigger input. Then the aim is shown as in below objective function.
a) with access to the training instance of the target prediction or label: If the adversary could access any one training instance I tar of the target object that would be legally predicted as the target prediction or classified as the target label, let's assume the neural inputs of the neurals of the (n+1)th layer isŻ n+1 when the model is fed with I tar before inserting the PoTrojan andZ n+1 after inserting the PoTrojan. Then we use the function
to calculate the desired optimal weight vector ξ * . b) without access to the training instance of the target prediction or label: If the adversary could not access any training instance of the target prediction or target label,Z n+1 cannot be directly retrieved. Assume when the neural inputs of the neurals of the (n + 1)th layer is ... Z n+1 , the adversary models output the desired prediction values or probabilities of the target labels. We propose applying a similar algorithm by [7] 
where the loss is defined as L. The gradient is calculated as
After getting ... Z, ξ * is computed by:
Note that we only train the neural inputs of the (n + 1)th layer. Thus we argue our approach is more efficient compared to other related work that require to re-train the whole learning models.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes to design powerful neural-level trojans or PoTrojans and insert them in pre-trained deep learning models. The proposed approach is very efficient, only requiring adding minimal extra neurals and synapses and doesn't increase the error rate of the host models. We have designed two different kinds of triggers that create rare triggering condition to prevent the inserted PoTrojans from being accidentally activated. Two different kinds of payloads based on whether the adversary has access to the training instance of the target prediction or classification labels are also designed to cause the host models to malfunction once the PoTrojans are triggered.
We are working on the experiments of validating the tacitness of the proposed PoTrojans before they are activated and the impact they would introduce to the host models when they are activated. 
